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Abstract

This study reviews the current US and Israel militarized response to Palestine, the negative
impacts on the Palestinian and Israeli people that result from this policy, and the militaryindustrial complex that benefits from the US-Israel relationship. I also note that the military
industry profits from the Israel-Palestine conflict and, thus, has an incentive for the conflict to
continue. I argue that despite billions of US dollars that have been appropriated by the U.S.
Congress for Israel’s security, the US and Israel have failed to build peace in the region,
ultimately wasting funds and exacerbating current conflicts. I also argue that Israel’s
militarization has measurable impacts on Israeli citizen’s quality of life. Finally, this paper
provides several alternatives to US and Israeli foreign policy regarding Palestine and the military
industry. I conclude that US policy toward Israel should focus on divesting from Israeli
weaponized digital technology and military capabilities.
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Chapter I - Introduction

The General Assembly Resolution 1514 (1961), The Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, states, “The process of liberation is irresistible
and inevitable.” Six years after the UN drafted this resolution, the Israeli government would
begin its occupation of the Gaza Strip. Although a “disengagement” process began in 2005, the
UN Security Council, UN General Assembly, and the Office of the Prosecutor at the
International Court of Justice all affirmed Israel’s status as an occupying power in 2009, 2011,
and 2014 respectively. Israel’s occupation of Palestine has led to a multitude of human rights
abuses with dire consequences for the Palestinian people1. With an estimated 750,000 refugee
population resulting from Israel’s initial settlement alone, and over 5 million Palestinian refugees
recognized as eligible for assistance from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA), the Palestinian people have suffered large
scale displacement as a result of Israel’s policies2. The United States is one of Israel’s strongest
allies, providing substantial military aid and technical support to Israel annually. The US
Congress appropriated USD 3.8 billion in 2019 alone3. The US is, by extension, supporting the
militarized reaction to and occupation of the Palestinian people.
Human Rights Watch describes Israel’s military occupation of Palestine as “draconian”
in a report that highlights Israel’s use of the military to repress even peaceful demonstrations
within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip4. This militarization comes with brutal control of

1

Halper, Jeff, and Karma R. Chávez. "“War against the People,” May 4, 2016." Journal of Civil and Human Rights
5/5 (2019): 158-74.
2
“Palestine Refugees.” UNRWA, n.d. https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees.
3
Sharp, Jerry. November 16th, 2020. “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel”. Congressional Research Service.
4
Human Rights Watch. Israel/Palestine. 2020. https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/north-africa/israel/palestine.
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Palestinian – Israeli borders, creating a heightened security state within both Israel and Palestine.
Military action by Israeli forces in Palestine has transcended beyond typical responding to
occasional outbreaks of violence. Amnesty International describes forced evictions, excessive
force and unlawful killings, a lack of freedom of movement, and arbitrary detention of thousands
of Palestinians5. In 2020, as many as 31 Palestinians were victims of extrajudicial killings; nine
of which were children. As Dr. Diana Greenwald of City College of New York states, “The West
Bank is not under occupation. It is under military rule.”6
Israel’s occupation of Palestine has not been without resistance. This resistance has taken
many forms, from armed groups like the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Fatah, or the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, to academic and political critics of Israel
occupation in the Middle East and beyond.
Israel’s claim to the Gaza Strip is a highly contested one, at least outside of Israel. The
United States has also met heavy criticism of its economic and military aid to Israel, from
organized efforts like the Boycott, Divest, and Sanction (BDS) movement, currently popular on
US college campuses, to vocal US representatives and academics speaking out against the “Israel
lobby.” Any criticism of Israel has been characterized as anti-Zionism or even anti-Semitism –
the present study does not make light of those concerns. Similarly, any support of Palestine can
be characterized as support for terrorism given that many armed liberation groups operating in
Palestine have used and continue to use terrorism as a method of resistance. However, within the
US government, support for the policy of economic and military aid to Israel is nearly universal.

5

Amnesty International. “Everything You Need to Know about Human Rights in Israel and Occupied Palestinian
Territories.” Everything you need to know about human rights in Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories,
Amnesty International. 2020. https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/israel-andoccupied-palestinian-territories/report-israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/.
6
Greenwald, Diana B. “Military Rule in the West Bank.” Project on Middle East Political Science, July 13, 2020.
https://pomeps.org/military-rule-in-the-west-bank.
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The state department writes, “Americans and Israelis are united by our shared commitment to
democracy, economic prosperity, and regional security. The unbreakable bond between our two
countries has never been stronger.”7 The US identifies Israel as an economic and regional
partner, one that shares its values in democracy and supports the US interests in the Middle East.
Democratic and Republican Party Platforms use nearly identical language in their support of
Israel. Both parties describe Israel as a strategic partner in the Middle East that not only provides
geo-political support, but is also a strong trading partner, especially in military and security
hardware and technology, such as drones, tanks, and cruise missiles8. Two members of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, Senators Gary Peters, a Democrat from Michigan, and Tom
Cotton, a Republican from Arkansas, introduced bill S 3775, the “United States-Israel Military
Capability Act of 2020.”9 This legislation, which is still pending, aims to create a working group
between the US and Israel that would:
(1) provide a standing forum for the United States and Israel to identify and share
intelligence-informed military capability requirements; (2) assist defense suppliers in
both countries to gain government approval for conducting joint science, technology,
research, development, test, evaluation, and production efforts; and (3) develop combined
U.S.-Israel plans to research, develop, procure, and field weapons systems and military
capabilities to meet common capability requirements.10
It is clear that the US and the Israeli government are heavily invested in Israel’s security
and by extension Israel’s occupation of Palestine. This investment is demonstrated in two ways.
The first has been, as mentioned, through the appropriation of economic and security assistance

7

“U.S. Relations With Israel - United States Department of State.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of
State, May 24, 2021. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-israel/.
8
Roblin, Sébastien. “Israel Bombing Gaza to Stop Hamas Rockets Shows Why Its U.S. Military Aid Should End.”
NBCNews.com. NBCUniversal News Group, May 14, 2021.https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/israelbombing-gaza-stop-hamas-rockets-shows-why-its-u-ncna1267381.
9
U.S. Congress, Senate, United States-Israel Military Capability Act of 2020, H.R.7148, 116th Cong., introduced in
the Senate 06/11/2020, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7148/related-bills?r=2&s=1
10
U.S. Congress, 2020
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in the form of grants, loans and loan guarantees. The current proposal before congress is for USD
38 billion in military weapons to be provided Israel over a ten year period, from 2019-202811.
However, this appropriation includes the transfer of equipment and technology from private US
based companies. For example, Boeing and United Technologies Corporation supply aviation
technology; Hewlett-Packard has transferred the technology for the Israeli military computers,
including those used at Israeli military checkpoints on the borders with Palestine12. Israel has
become the most consequential recipient of US security assistance and arms sales. Since 2001,
Israel has received USD 63 billion from the US13. Figure 2 provides a yearly breakdown of arms
sales since 2015. Most of this funding is part of the State Department’s Foreign Military
Financing Program, a grant program that provides funds to purchase US arms14.
The second form of investment is a discursive investment in a narrative that blunts the
impact of Israel’s critics in the US. The clearest example of this investment is US
Congresswoman Ilhan Omar’s recent criticism of Israeli special interest groups were framed as
anti-Semitic15. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo claimed in November of 2020 that any
boycott of Israel - referring to the BDS movement - is “anti-Semitic cancer.”16 This has greatly
limited legitimate claims of Israel’s human rights abuse, and diminished the ability of ordinary

11

Sharp, Jerry. November 16th, 2020. “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel”. Congressional Research Service.
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf
12
“Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Explained.” American Friends Service Committee, October 4, 2019.
https://www.afsc.org/story/boycott-divestment-and-sanctions-explained.
13
Yousif, Elias. April 2021. “Factsheet: US Arms Sales and Security Assistance to Israel.” Security Assistance
Monitor. Center for International Policy, n.d. https://securityassistance.org/publications/factsheet-us-arms-sales-andsecurity-assistance-to-israel/.
14
Yousif, Elias. April 2021.
15
Karnowski, Steve. “Omar: Go to Israel, See 'Cruel Reality of the Occupation'.” AP NEWS. Associated Press,
August 20, 2019.
16
“BDS Israel Boycott Group Is Anti-Semitic, Says US.” BBC News. BBC, November 19, 2020.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54999010.
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citizens to effectively participate in global political movements like BDS. These financial and
discursive investments need to be public, investigated, and debated.
The question of the Israel-Palestine conflict has been a primary focus for US foreign
policy in the Middle East since World War II. Recently former President Donald Trump took one
of the most decisive actions toward strengthening Israel’s legitimacy when he moved the US
embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a move welcomed by Israel and heavily protested by
Palestinians and US allies.
I argue that the US and Israel ensure an ongoing and deadly conflict through their
investment in the military industrial complex. To prevent further loss of life from both Israel and
Palestine, and to rectify the US policies that have so heavily invested in and benefited from this
ongoing conflict, I argue for a demilitarization and de-escalation of Israel’s relationship with
Palestine. Peaceful cooperation between Palestine and Israel is possible, but not in the context of
the current imbalance of military and discursive power that has led to Palestinians being
unlawfully killed, detained, and displaced17. The US, Israel, and the global community have a
responsibility to ensure that these killings, detentions, and displacements do not continue. On
January 16th, 1961, President Eisenhower said this in his farewell speech, “In the councils of
government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced
power exists and will persist.” In this present review study, I will demonstrate that in the case of
the Israel-Palestine conflict this warning has not been heeded with disastrous outcomes for both
sides.

17

Amnesty International. “Everything You Need to Know about Human Rights in Israel and Occupied Palestinian
Territories.” Everything you need to know about human rights in Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories,
Amnesty International. 2020.
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These arguments will be further developed in the following chapters: Chapter III will
analyze the history of US investment in Israel and the political platforms of the major US parties.
I am especially interested in the similarities between the Democratic and Republican party
platforms in relation to Israel-Palestine. Chapter IV will critique the militarization of the IsraeliPalestinian cyber security state. I will investigate the justifications for the increasingly
militarized response and discuss its outcomes. Chapter V discusses the Israel’s militarized
response to Palestinian protest. Chapter VI will discuss the militarized borders and checkpoints
on the borders of Israel and Palestine and the use of technologies and tactics that are shared
between Israel and the United States. In Chapter VII, I will make the case that Israel’s militarized
society has had negative impacts on gender and class issues, ultimately harming the Israeli
people. These chapters support my claim that the US and Israel’s continued investment in the
conflict only increase loss of life by outlining: who invests in the conflict, what kinds of military
interventions are invested in, who becomes a target of the investment, and who gets impacted by
this conflict. Chapter VIII will have my concluding remarks and some final suggestions. Using a
qualitative research approach, I will analyze a number of primary and secondary sources, their
arguments and the connections among them. At the time of writing, the relationship between
Israel and Palestine is still evolving, due not only to the historical factors outlined in this text, but
the recent elections in the United States and Israel and the global response to the COVID-19
pandemic.
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Chapter II - Literature Review
The militarization of the conflict between Israel and Palestine is of growing interest to
academics, NGOS, and politicians alike. A number of studies have been published regarding the
use of force, surveillance, military technology, and military aid. Following is a review of the
studies that have informed the present review of US military assistance to Israel and the prospect
for peace between Israel and Palestine. Ultimately, many of these authors and myself argue that
the US military assistance provided to Israel encourages conflict rather than providing defense.
Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, Territory and Power, edited by
Elia Zureik, David Lyon, and Yasmeen Abu-Laban, provides context for Israeli digital
surveillance, militarism, and border technologies and their use. The introduction by Elia Zureik,
who wrote on the use of digital technologies to monitor and control Palestinian citizens, analyze
two critical aspects of Israel’s military control: (1) the use of the Gaza border wall to control the
movement of people and goods, greatly interrupting Palestinian’s access to medical supplies and
services, building materials, and their jobs, many of which are within Israel and (2) the use of
surveillance technologies, such as facial recognition, to police Palestinians. In the same text, the
chapter by Ariel Handel’s chapter describes the extensive border apparatus used by Israel to
discourage movement within and between Israel-Palestine. Both authors described the
relationship between US security forces, industry, and Israeli private corporations. Israeli
corporations create security and military technology that is developed and tested in Palestine and
then sold and used globally, including in the United States18. Handel observes that surveillance is
not only employed for security, but also to mark, control, and displace Palestinians19.In addition

18

Zuriek, Elia, Yasmeen Abu-Laban, David Lyon. 2011. “Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population,
Territory, and Power.” Routledge; 1st edition. 218.
19
Zuriek, Elia, et al. 2011. 22.
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surveillance technologies generate income through the acquisition and selling of personal and
private data20. Handel ‘s analysis applies Michel Foucault’s concept of biopower - the control of
large groups of people - to frame the discussion of Israeli surveillance tactics. Chiefly, Handel
claims that Israel has racialized and “othered” the Palestinian people, viewing them as a threat
and a commodity. Palestinians become a commodity when they sell their labor power to Israel,
mostly in the form of manual or service labor. Palestinians become a threat in their demands for
refugee resettlement, land redistribution, and Great March of Return protests that demand both. I
will expand further on the Great March of Return protests in chapter five. From this perspective,
Israel continually advances its security and surveillance systems to increasingly control daily
life, even as Palestinians’ movements between Israel and Palestine is primarily for work within
Israel21.
Palestine: A Socialist Introduction, edited by Sumaya Awad and Brian Bean, provides a
theoretical perspective for the present review study. Another edited volume of contributed works,
Shireen Akram-Boshar’s chapter “How Israel Became the Watchdog State: US Imperialism and
the Middle East” and Khury Petersen-Smith’s chapter “Cops Here, Bombs There: BlackPalestinian Solidarity” provide both a historical and modern understanding of the Israel-Palestine
conflict. These chapters highlight the connections between the Israeli military, US financing, and
US security/police forces. These texts helped shape my understanding of the ways race, class,
and gender inform the conflict between Israel-Palestine. These texts also highlight the complex
and changing nature of this conflict. Different US administrations, Israeli governments, and
Palestinian leaders all have played a role in shaping Israel’s statehood and its relationship to the

20
21

Zuriek, Elia, et al. 2011. 22.
Zuriek, Elia, et al. 2011. 22. Xxi.
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Palestinian people. In particular, these texts highlight how the 1948-49 war between Israel and
several Arab states, and the Cold War, have influenced both Israel’s and the United States’
relationship with each other and with the Arab world more generally.
Several academic articles also greatly informed this thesis. Erik Skare’s “Digital
Surveillance/Militant Resistance: Categorizing the ‘Proto-state Hacker’” provides insight into
Palestinian efforts to resist Israeli digital surveillance. This text helped clarify how Israeli
surveillance impacts ordinary Palestinian lives through the digital invasion of privacy. This
violates Palestinian’s right to privacy as outlined by the UDHR and he Convention on Civil and
Political Rights. Skare highlights the actions of resistance networks within Palestine to show
that Palestinian people are actively engaged in their own liberation efforts. Despite this,
Palestine’s marginalized position on the global scale means that for the most part, resistance is
led by informal resistance groups, instead of more legitimate grassroots NGOs22. Despite this,
international NGOs like Human Rights Watch have provided in-depth analysis of Israeli
militarization. Skare points out that if Palestine is able to gain more legitimacy, it can create
more international alliances and NGOs instead of relying on “proto-state hackers.”
Ronald R. Krebs, a researcher from the Council on Foreign Relations, provides an
analysis of Israeli militarization in “Israel's Bunker Mentality: How the Occupation Is
Destroying the Nation''. I found this text to be very helpful in understanding the various ways
militarization within Israel is harming not only Palestine, but Israel itself. In particular, I
appreciated Krebs’ analysis of Israel's far-right nationalism. Krebs writes, “By inducing a bunker
mentality among Israelis, the occupation has bred an aggressive ethnic nationalism that
privileges the interests of Israel's Jewish citizens over those of its Arab citizens.”

22

Skare, Erik. 2016. Digital Jihad: Palestinian Resistance in the Digital Era. London: Zed Book Ltd. 67.
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This ethnic nationalism reinforces and is reinforced by Israel’s “bunker mentality” or its
extensive military and security apparatus. While I do not agree that Israel should reject liberalism
for a more centrist approach, I appreciate Kreb’s denunciation of Israel’s far-right and the violent
racism and militarism that it breeds.
“The Destined Homeland or the Eternal Fortress: The Militarization of Israel” by Shamir
Hassan provides even more history and context. Like the authors of Palestine: A Socialist
Introduction, Hassan points to the 1948-49 war and the Cold War as moments that defined Israel
and the United States’ relationship. In addition, Hassan claims that in the post- 9/11 period the
US reinforced its commitment to Israel and the region as a whole, once again viewing the
relationship as important and militarily strategic.
Nadine Naber’s “The U.S. and Israel Make the Connections for Us: Anti-Imperialism and
Black-Palestinian Solidarity” and Rebecca T. Alpert’s “Jewish Feminist Justice Work: Focus on
Israel/Palestine” both provide an in-depth analysis of US and Israel activist networks working
around the issue of the US-Israel military relationship and its damaging outcomes for
Palestinians. These texts also point out that the Palestinian struggle against Israeli militarism is
globally part of a greater movement that criticizes militarized police and security forces. This
analysis is reinforced by the shared technologies and tactics of both Israeli and US security and
police. These texts were foundational to my argument as they highlight a number of the
connections I found, including the training of US police in Palestine and the shared use of
military technologies to control protests.
Finally, the chapter “Introduction: From the Mexico-U.S. Borderlands to Palestine” from
Palestine on the Air by Karma R. Chavez was extremely informative regarding the connections
between the US and Israel-Palestine borders and activist networks. In this chapter, Chavez goes

13

in depth on the demands of BDS activists and their connections with border activists in the US.
In particular, I appreciate Chavez’s description of BDS’s demands, which he outlined as:
1. Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall, 2.
Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full
equality 3. Respecting, protecting, and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to
return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194323.
This clear set of demands was needed to help BDS, a loose activist network, composed
mostly of US-based university students, to find clear and consistent messages. Chavez points out
that the border activists in the group Coalición de Derechos Humanos are making connections
with BDS activists as they view their struggle against militarized border police as being similar,
providing context for solidarity. Chavez’s text reinforces each of my own claims: that the
Israel/Palestine relationship is dominated by militarized action, that this militarized action is
causing damage to the Palestinian people, and that the US reproduces much of that militarization
either through military funding, private corporation investments, or using Israeli technologies
and tactics on its own citizens.

23

Chávez, Karma R. "Introduction: From the Mexico-U.S. Borderlands to Palestine." Journal of Civil and Human
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Chapter III - Cracking the Iron Dome: US Aid to Israel
In 1966, a spokesperson for the Israeli foreign office explained, “The United States has
come to the conclusion that it can no longer respond to every incident around the world, that it
must rely on a local power, the deterrent of a friendly power as a first line to stave off America’s
direct involvement. Israel feels it fits this definition.”24 This sentiment has, in the decades since,
become widely shared within US policy making, a point that I will expand upon in this chapter.
Israel’s geopolitical position has made it an invaluable asset and ally to the United States as it
has served US interests militarily, technologically, and diplomatically. The US has sent millions
of dollars in aid annually since Israel’s inception, though it was the Middle East proxy wars of
the Cold War period that initiated the military aid that now defines the US relationship with
Israel25. Israel has used these military funds to not only shore up its own defenses against an
increasingly unstable or hostile region, but to pursue its military interests. Israel and Palestine
have had a protracted and violent relationship; both parties have made a claim to the same
territory on the basis of history and tradition. US aid to Israel thus supports Israel’s domination
of the Palestinian people in both direct and indirect ways.
The United States’ own position on the Palestinian people, land, and Israeli settlements,
is complex. The United States seems to have turned away from the destructive conflict between
the two nations, either out of indifference or perceived benefit to Israel from the ongoing Israeli
land grab26.

24

Veracini, Lorenzo. "The Other Shift: Settler Colonialism, Israel, and the Occupation." Journal of Palestine Studies
42, no. 2 (2013): 26-42.
25
Halper, Jeff, and Karma R. Chávez. May 4, 2016. 162.
26
Owen Jones. “Israeli apartheid in Palestine devastatingly exposed by senior Palestinian”. April 30, 2021. Video,
8:43. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sa8dfSnfp2Q
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The United States has indirectly supported Israel’s occupation through military funding,
joint research, and technology transfers27. Israel has supported the US in its efforts within the
Arab region28 by preventing Iranian and Russian influence and the normalization of relations
with states like Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and now under the Abraham Accords Peace
Agreement, relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain29.
Israel has trained United States police officers on the military-style tactics they use to
control Palestinian protestors. The militarization of US police forces is reflected in increased
expenditures for military-style equipment, including purchases by US police departments
directly from the US Defense Department. Israel’s border fortifications and technology have also
influenced the United States’ border control policy on the US-Mexico border. Both the IsraelPalestine and US-Mexico border control operations are highly militarized and have resulted in
high rates of violence, death.30
The military relationship between the United States and Israel involves military aid in the
form of access to equipment, technical support, and knowledge-sharing in both military strategy
and technology. Military aid to Israel is not unwarranted as Israel has assisted the US in counterterrorism operations in the wake of 9/11 and in counteracting the influence of Iran in the region.
In The Destined Homeland or an Eternal Fortress: The Militarization of Israel Shamir
Hassan writes,
Israeli society over the decades has been fed with the belief that it is in a perpetual state
of siege. This is held to justify the existence of a large military establishment that absorbs

27

Sharp, Jerry. November 16th, 2020. 3.
ERDOĞAN, AYFER, and LOURDES HABASH. 2020. 130.
29
Roblin, Sébastien. May 14, 2021.
30
Naber. 2017. 18.
28
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substantial portions of Israel's resources, and has moreover, led to the infiltration of the
military and military mind in the civil sectors.31
After Israel’s experience in the 1948-1949 war in which Israel defeated a number of Arab states,
including Palestine, Israel made several policy assumptions that inform its militarization today:
1. That Israel’s geopolitical position within the Middle East and North African region made
incoming threats imminent and potentially disastrous for Israel’s civilians, 2. Israel would be
materially inferior to its attackers in both military equipment and number of available
combatants, and 3. Israel’s military capabilities would need to be strong enough to ensure that a
decisive victory was impossible thereby making deterrence the primary security policy
objective32. The United States has provided USD 142.3 billion in bilateral assistance and missile
defense funding between the end of World War II and 2020 and, as noted above, military aid
continues in the form of Foreign Military Financing, arms sales, defense budget appropriations,
and loan guarantees to purchase military equipment33.
Today Israel’s current military and defense strategy aims to respond to the instability in
the Middle East, specifically it is concerned with the activities of non-state actors in Syria and, of
course, the need for peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan to remain stable34. In comparison,
Palestine is a minimal security threat to Israel. The number of active security and military forces
and the amount of defense spending in Palestine are far lower than in Israel35. In 2019, Israel’s

31

Hassan, Shamir. "THE DESTINED HOMELAND OR AN ETERNAL FORTRESS: THE MILITARIZATION
OF ISRAEL." Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 67 (2006): 888-93.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44148007.
32
Hassan, Shamir. "THE DESTINED HOMELAND OR AN ETERNAL FORTRESS: THE
MILITARIZATION OF ISRAEL." Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 67 (2006): 888-93.
33
Cordesman, Anthony H. The Changing Security Dynamics of the Middle East and North Africa. Report. Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2020. 54.
34
Cordesman, Anthony H. 2020. 55.
35
Cordesman, Anthony H. 2020. 56.
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military expenditure was USD 19.3 billion36. Palestine’s own military spending is hard to
calculate, though the number of outside supporters has greatly decreased, resulting in a less
uniform and cohesive military force37.
The relationship dynamic between Israel and Palestine, at least militarily, is clearly
deeply imbalanced. The Trump administration’s policy to cut ties with the Palestinian Authority
and recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is a significant cultural and material setback to
Palestine’s effort to be recognized as an independent state on a par with Israel politically38.
In terms of security forces, Israel’s heavily militarized response to Palestine including
the installation of an extensive digital security apparatus, heavily armed response to nearly every
protest, and a heavily militarized border force, seems excessive and inappropriate . However,
when we consider what the United States and international corporations can gain from this
militarization, this dynamic becomes clear. In 2020, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
presented President Trump with an USD 8 billion “wish list” of military technologies he wanted
to purchase from the US, including stealth jets and bombs. This purchase would be made using
some of the USD 8 billion in security assistance that Israel is set to receive from the US
Congress from 2019 to 202839.
I will analyze the Democratic and Republican party platforms with regard to Israel and
demonstrate their unanimous support of Israel - essentially blocking any policy alternatives and
condemning the efforts of NGOs to effectively speak against Israeli military practices. These

36
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party platforms frame any critique of Israel as anti-Semitic. This section will by no means cover
the entirety of the US-Israel relationship - rather I hope to demonstrate that the modern US-Israel
relationship benefits both political parties while allowing for and contributing to the end of the
Palestinian state.

True Bipartisanship: The Democratic and Republican Platforms United
Due to the recent 2020 election the major US political parties have released “party
platforms,” a document that acts as a policy guideline for elected officials in that party. These
documents are important to the understanding of US domestic and foreign policy - both the
democratic and republican platforms contain sections discussing their policy towards Israel. In
this section, I will review what these platforms reveal about US policy toward Israel and
Palestine. Most notably, I have found that the platforms, with some differences in language,
determine what are essentially the same policy goals. In this, I find that US policy on Israel is
unanimous and, at the moment, nearly non-negotiable. This means that any policy suggestions I
make in the conclusion of this study would most likely not be considered by the two mainstream
political parties in 2021 and beyond into the next election cycle.
The Democratic Party released a new platform in 2020 to coincide with the campaign of
President Joseph Biden. The platform clearly states: Democratic support for Israel, Democratic
support of the Palestinian people, the support for a two-state solution, and a condemnation of
violence from either Israel or Palestine. The platform states, “We oppose any effort to unfairly
single out and delegitimize Israel, including at the United Nations or through the Boycott,
Divestment, and Sanctions Movement.”40 I find this section of the party platform somewhat
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contradictory to its earlier stated support of Palestinians. The Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions
Movement (BDS) movement does not aim to destabilize or delegitimize Israel; it aims to draw
attention to and stop Israel’s killing, detention, and displacement of Palestinians and demand that
Israel respect international law41. To do this, BDS asks citizens and governments to boycott
Israeli goods, divest from Israeli companies, and use targeted sanctions on Israeli defense and
military contractors. The BDS movement is also not a singular organization, but a network of
activists, individuals, and organizations worldwide that range from formal organizational
support42 to on the ground activism from students in the US and beyond43. Both the Democratic
and Republican parties claim BDS is anti-Semitic and refuse to acknowledge its growing
popularity. Despite these claims, Jewish organizations within Israel and its diaspora have also
criticized Israel’s state-sponsored violence against the Palestinian people44. The UN Resolution
194 is used by Jewish and Palestinian activists to argue for a Palestinian “land back” process.
The resolution, adopted in 1948, defines Palestinians’ right to settlement and the return of
refugees to their homes45.
The Republican Party chose to not release a new platform for 2020. The stated reason is
that due to COVID-19’s impact on the Republican Convention, drafting such a document was
not possible because there could not be sufficient participation of state delegations. As a result,
they re-released their 2016 party platform. The 2016 Republican platform has similar language
around its support for Israel, noting its long relationship with the United States, its particular
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geopolitical significance within the Middle East, and its democratic values. The platform also
decries the BDS movement, calling it anti-Semitic. This platform differs from the Democratic
platform in its support for Palestine. The Republican party platform does not mention Palestine
at all except in reference to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In
2016 the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC allowed Palestine to become a “states party” to
the Convention. Since then, Palestine has assumed a leadership role among developing countries
in the governance arrangements of the convention. The Republican Party Platform cites this
development as one of the reasons why the US should withhold funding for the UNFCCC
secretariat. The 2016 GOP Party Platform also dropped any reference to a two-state solution.
The UNFCCC treaty describes Palestine as a territorial entity46. The Republican party is in favor
of a one-state solution, that state being Israel. This is a major departure from the Democratic
party platform, and from standard US policy on the question of Palestinian statehood. Both US
parties affirm that their relationship to Israel takes precedence in the Middle East. The US and
Israel have a common interest in Middle Eastern peace, and this interest resulted in the Camp
David Accords. The Camp David Accords, political agreements signed between Israel and Egypt
and brokered by the United States, resulted in peace between Israel and Egypt, paving the way
for peaceful negotiations in the Middle East for Israel and the United States47. While vital to
creating peace in the region, the Camp David Accords were ultimately rejected by the UN in
Resolutions 34/70 and 34/65 B for the failure to consult the PLO, not complying the
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Palestinian’s right to return or self-determination and demanded Israel withdraw from all
occupied territories48;49.
It is clear that the United States’ support for Israel is bipartisan. The documents lay out
their reasoning very clearly. The Democrats and Republicans both agree that Israel is
geopolitically important in the Middle East region. Both parties feel a cultural and historical
connection to Israel. Both parties feel the need to defend Israel from anti-Semitic rhetoric and
abuse, especially in the UN Security Council or Economic and Social Council or the Human
Rights Council. For both parties the BDS movement as a vector of anti-Semitism. The
discursive and normative framework of US policymakers clearly positions US relations with
Israel as so important as to be above critique - even when Israel’s actions directly negatively
impact the lives of Palestinians and violate international human rights law.
Jerry M. Sharp from the Congressional Research Service explains the amount and types
of funding Israel has received since its inception to 2020. Israel receives various kinds of
security assistance.50 In 2016, the US and Israel signed their third Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), a pledge for the US to supply USD 38 billion in military aid to Israel in
the form of military grants over ten years (ending in 2028). Sharp explains that Israel is the
largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. These military grants
are supplemented by individual administration’s own grant making; for example, the Trump
administration secured an additional USD 3 billion for Israel in the form of Foreign Military
Financing grants, or FMFs, for the purchase of, among other things, F-35 fighter jets. The US-
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Israel relationship is defined by military funding that receives bipartisan support in both the
House and the Senate. From a realist perspective, this funding is rational - Israel provides a
strategic geo-political advantage for the United States in this region. Acknowledging this, I
understand that policy change regarding Israel in the United States is unlikely, especially
considering the MOU funding commitment does not end for at least seven more years. However,
the recent escalation and resulting ceasefire between Israel and Hamas brought an increase in
international and congressional attention; more members of Congress were willing to discuss
this issue51. While there is strong bipartisan political support for Israel overall, activist networks
will continue to place pressure on the Israeli government to honor its agreements and respect the
human rights of the Palestinian people.
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Chapter IV - The Creation of the Watchdog State: Digital Security and Surveillance in
Palestine
In Elia Zuriek’s introduction and first chapter to Surveillance and Control in
Israel/Palestine, he explains that surveillance can be understood as a structural system existing in
both material - towers, drones, cameras, and digital technologies - and discursive forms permissible knowledge, state borders, and identity. Using Foucault’s concept of biopower,
Zuriek claims that surveillance is both a means of control and a means of constructing the
justifications for that control. Whether or not surveillance is successful in protecting the state is
only secondary to its ability to mark, control, and contain certain undesirable populations52. In
the context of Israel-Palestine, Zuriek claims that Israel has been historically constructed to and
operates as a means of surveilling the Middle East53. Palestine in particular faces much of the
brunt of Israel's eyes, as its people and borders are in a constant state of surveillance and control
- from frequent roadside checkpoints to countless security cameras to digital surveillance,
Israel’s control methods and technologies are expansive54. Of course, surveillance is a global
phenomenon, one that does not exist only within this context. However, Surveillance and
Control in Israel/Palestine makes the case that Israel’s historical position within the Middle East
is of particular concern because of the Cold War and later the United States’ increased presence
in the region post-9/11. Similarly, surveillance can only become global by exporting surveillance
methods and technologies. Israel is second only to the United States as the largest developer and
exporter of surveillance technologies and methods. Those technologies and methods are
developed and tested in their use to control and monitor the Palestinian people. Israel, through its
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deployment of these technologies, has become the “Watchdog State”, categorizing, othering,
data collecting, monitoring, and controlling the Palestinian people. Through a careful
examination of Israel as a security state, its justifications, and its abuses, observers have built a
solid argument for dismantling Israel’s extensive security apparatus - and seek a better future out
of the watchful eye of overzealous and controlling institutions. In this chapter I will explore the
digital, material, discursive forms of surveillance Israel deploys against Palestinians - and the
forms of resistance that are developed in response.

The Digital State Hacked: Digital Structures of Surveillance and Digital Resistors
Erik Skare’s Digital Surveillance/Militant Resistance: Categorizing the ‘Proto-State
Hacker, Skare draws parallels between Israel-Palestine’s non-digital relationship with its current
digital one. Skare argues that global digital surveillance systems and structures have grown and
produced rapidly and are now utilized primarily by state governments as a means of control.
However, these same systems of control provide the means with which to fight back in
cyberspace. Skare writes on page 680,
We have seen that the developing cyber-infrastructure has saturated and strengthened allencompassing surveillance. Yet, the very same infrastructure has also provided the tools
to circumvent and resist it. The Israel/Palestine conflict is no different, and the dialectical
relationship between Israeli control and Palestinian resistance to it has produced the
unintended consequence of the “proto-state hacker” through emulating the features of a
modern state army.55
Skare takes time to describe the “proto-state hacker”; in Skare’s case, members of the Palestine
Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The PIJ members utilize the resources of their resistance organization to
develop the skills and tools to become “hacktivists,” those who use various means of technology
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to disrupt, interfere, or monitor governments or institutions. Thus, as Skare explained, the IsraelPalestine conflict is being reproduced within the cyber sphere, where Israel wields the power of
the state to monitor and control, and various local organizations utilize their own power to resist
and circumvent that same system. Skare points out this relationship is not in any way unique to
Israel-Palestine - it can be found within the Zapatistas in Mexico, cybersecurity groups in
Russia, and in both formal and informal groups within the United States, Anonymous being one
such example56.
State digital surveillance is a function of control. Israel is a driving force in the
globalization of digital surveillance technologies through its funding and outsourcing to private
companies57. Israel relies on its private companies to develop the technologies it uses to surveille
the Middle East and beyond. Often, these technologies are primarily deployed against the
Palestinian people58. Later, those same private companies will sell or use those same
technologies globally, disrupting democratic processes in already unstable nations and profiting
from threatened civil societies. Meanwhile, Israel rakes in the profits59. Israel is not alone in this
form of cyber capitalism. This is a global issue that the global community currently lacks the
political will and resources to address. Similarly, these digital surveillance technologies are
rapidly evolving, making tracking, analyzing, and understanding their deployment increasingly
difficult. What is clear is that without intervention, states like Israel and the United States will
continue to wield their digital surveillance power to crush networked resistance 60. What, then, is
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to be done? The somewhat obvious answer is an international treaty, governing body, and
institution to monitor and regulate the development and deployment of digital surveillance
technology. However, for the immediate, on-the-ground victims of digital surveillance, that
prospect most likely feels far off. So what are the digital resistors doing? Erik Skare writes in
Digital Jihad: Palestinian Resistance in the Digital Era on page 6,
What most of these groups have in common is that they have used hacktivism to promote
human rights or to protest against the violation of human rights, disclose confidential
information (for example through the use of WikiLeaks) and prevent the
commercialization of the Internet.61
Skare’s text demonstrates the difference between the social imagination of the “hacker” –
often a lone wolf using the internet to commit cybercrimes - and the political realm, where
groups of hacktivists are formed under a particular ideology or political agenda and use the very
same digital surveillance technologies to advance their political agenda62. Palestinian groups,
usually formed around religious or Arab identities, have used this form of digital activism for
decades. Groups such as the Gaza Hacker Team disrupt police surveillance of the West Bank,
essentially removing the digital capabilities of the Israeli forces that intrude on Palestinian
space, both physically and digitally63. Skare’s text highlights that the Gaza Hacker Team is
hardly alone in their actions; Palestinian groups are used to using this form of digital resistance
to reject surveillance both on the internet and within the West Bank’s borders. Similarly, these
groups have used hacking to expose human rights violations64. Finally, Skare points out that
these groups often form around the concept of their own hacking as a form of patriotic human
rights protection in which groups like the Gaza Hacker Team are demanding that their claims be
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heard, understood, and respected65. Additionally, these hacktivists do more than disrupt the
Israel-Palestine conflict. Hacktivists refuse to allow the normalization of a cybersecurity state, in
which concerns for privacy and human rights are ignored even in everyday use of the internet or
public space. Instead, the concern for security - and the profits that can be made from personal
data - trump any demand for privacy or human rights in the digital sphere66. Thus, when
hacktivists, regardless of their political stance with regards to Palestine, disrupt the extensive
digital security state, they are asserting their right to privacy and protection from state
surveillance. However, it should be noted that the victims of Israel’s security state are most often
Palestinians67. While Israel’s security network invades Palestinian civilian life, Israeli citizens
also face similar infringement on privacy and a normalization of human rights violations for the
sake of “security.” I will further examine the ways Israel’s militarized security response has
harmed the citizens of Israel in chapter six.

The Future of an Internationally Regulated and Demilitarized Digital Security Network
It would be foolish to claim Israel must simply lay down its cyber program and walk
away from its use of cyber security. The IDF’s National Cyber Defense is not unlike other
nation’s cyber security programs in its aims to protect both cyber and physical infrastructure
from outside or inside attack and disruption68. The abuse of cyber security is not a particularly
Israeli problem either; as mentioned, the United States and other nations participate in similar
structures of surveillance and control, both in the public and private sectors, systems that not
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only infringe upon privacy rights, but see governments and firms make huge profits from those
infringements69. What makes the Israel case of particular concern is its historical and modern
domination of the Palestinian people70. In this case, cyber surveillance is a continuation and
sometimes an escalation of the existing conflict, in which the Israeli government and private
companies can now monitor and enforce in the digital lives of Palestinians71. Digital surveillance
becomes a reproduction of settler colonialism, a reproduction that is then commodified and
marketed on a global scale. No, I will not argue that states like Israel need to dismantle their
security networks. However, it is clear that both capitalism and colonialism greatly inform the
design, implementation, and targets of Israel’s digital security state. Hacktivists provide only
temporary relief, if any - their actions are more a disruption of surveillance norms than actual
solutions to them. It is clear that we need, on a global scale, a community effort to research,
regulate, and reform the cyber state. Until then, we are all victims, but those already targeted by
the state are hurt the most. The militarization of the internet has no borders and no significant
pushback - cybercrimes and cyber warfare will increase without proper resource allocation to
address them.
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Chapter V - Disparity of Power, Disparity of Consequence: The Use of Violence to Control
Protest
As mentioned, the Palestinian people have used violence, including terror attacks, to
make claims about territory, identity, and material distribution72. While I would still argue that
the Israeli response to Palestinian violence is not proportionate, that is not my focus here. Rather,
I want to explore Palestinians’ use of nonviolent direct action and the highly militarized and
violent response this kind of civil protest evokes. I titled this chapter “Disparity of Power,
Disparity of Consequence” because that is how I and the authors I will cite regard this issue.
Israel, in relation to Palestine, has an enormous monopoly on power and violence. Likewise,
when Palestine rejects that violence, even in non-violent action, Palestinians have a monopoly of
consequence - their punishment is heightened security, militarized civilian life, and often death.
As I have previously stated and will discuss in the following chapters, this power dynamic that
we see between the Israeli government and the Palestinian resistance forces is being reproduced
within the United States and elsewhere. In the US and Europe police are using military tactics
and technologies to control peaceful protests.

From the Global South to our Backyard: The Protest Violence Industry
Khaled Eligindy’s article, “Why Palestinians Protest” gives a good summary of the more
moderate demands of the Palestinian people. Those that Eligindy studied for his article are not
like the PLO in their demands, at least not openly. Rather, the protesting Palestinians demanded
very basic freedoms and basic needs . They wanted a more representative government led by
Palestinians and within Palestine and real progress on the Israel-Palestine peace negotiations.
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And they wanted food and fuel prices that were reasonable for those living in Palestine73.
Palestinians have also peacefully protested to address the racialized violence in their
communities by Israeli police forces74. Previously, Palestinians have used nonviolent protest to
demonstrate against ongoing military violence from Israel; in one instance, the protest only
stopped because of the number protesters that were killed or wounded75. From 2018 to 2019,
190 protestors were killed by live ammunition during protests - and over 28,000 were injured,
including bullet wounds to limbs that left Palestinians permanently disabled76. The UN has said
Israel may have committed a war crime by intentionally targeting civilians77. The bulk of these
killings occurred during the Great Return Marches. The Great Return Marches were an
organized, nonviolent march toward the Israel-Gaza border fence. The marches were an assertion
of Palestinian land rights, intended to bring more attention to the Palestinian Right of Return as
enshrined in United Nations Resolution 19478. The organizers argue that the estimated 750,000
Palestinian refugees have a right to return to their land7980. The marches were organized by a
collective of civil society, human rights activists, BDS activists, and local and international
political representatives81. Despite the pressure of this campaign and the international attention it
gained, Israel refused to lift the now 13 yearlong illegal blockade on Palestinian refugees
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entering Israel82. Protestors, journalists, civilians, and children encountered live ammunition and
military grade weapons. Amnesty International writes,
According to military experts as well as a forensic pathologist who reviewed photographs
of injuries obtained by Amnesty International, many of the wounds observed by doctors
in Gaza are consistent with those caused by high-velocity Israeli-manufactured Tavor
rifles using 5.56mm military ammunition. Other wounds bear the hallmarks of USmanufactured M24 Remington sniper rifles shooting 7.62mm hunting ammunition, which
expand and mushroom inside the body83.
So what makes nonviolent protest so deadly in Palestine? And how does this highly militarized
response to direct civil action get reproduced in the United States? Several authors have made
connections between Palestine and the States’ use of force against nonviolent protests, which I
will discuss momentarily. However, as I do, I want you to consider what alternatives the people
of Palestine have in the face of this power dynamic. When even nonviolent protest is met with
lethal force, what does that mean for the people living in the West Bank? What future do they
have under a military rule that seems ready to kill them at any sign of resistance?
“‘The US and Israel Make the Connections for Us’ Anti-Imperialism and BlackPalestinian Solidarity” by Nadine Naber does not open with a description of a Palestinian protest,
but an American one. Specifically, Naber describes the 2014 Ferguson, Missouri, protests which
occurred in reaction to a White police officer killing Michael Brown. The protesters were met
with military grade weaponry and response, including tear gas, smoke bombs, stun grenades, and
tanks. The canisters used to carry the tear gas and smoke bombs were the same as the canisters
used to deploy cannons and motors on the Gaza Strip. Those canisters were manufactured in the
United States84. Naber explains that protesters within the United States have grown to identify
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with protestors in Palestine due, but not limited to, the use of military force and tactics to punish
and dissuade dissent, the racialized othering of protesters, and often, the common initial cause of
those protests - usually some form of police or military brutality that doesn’t match the crime (or
supposed crime) committed. The militarization of police response to protests in the United States
is a recent but escalating development, one that continually mirrors Palestine’s experience85.
That mirroring is not without reason; US police are sometimes training in Israel to learn IDF
military tactics and become familiar with IDF military technologies to bring them home and use
on American protestors86. Once again, the confluence of industry and colonialism become clear;
the United States and Israel profit from selling military technologies to each other and use those
same technologies and tactics to suppress minority groups. However, within this, Naber finds
hope. Using the commonalities of these struggles, Naber hopes activist groups can push back on
things like the diverting of funding from community projects into militarized police87. Similarly,
she hopes that these commonalities can make their activist projects more international, finding
strength in their common confrontation with militarized police and strengthening the differences
they face both historically and geographically.
Building stronger activist networks is key to finding solutions and building an
international community around the de-escalation of police and protests. Those networks also
highlight how this truly is a global issue. A simple analysis of the Ferguson protests or the Israeli
reaction to Palestinian protests would suggest that individual nations need better police reforms
or regulations. When American police officers learn military tactics and receive military
technologies from Israel, no other argument can be made: police militarization, and the
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suppression of non-violent protests are global issues that require international response.
Professor Charisse Burden-Stelly summarized this well in the panel discussion where she said,
“The training of U.S. police forces by Israeli Soldiers is very important because we see it
manifested and weaponized against domestic occupied peoples.”88 Burden-Stelly, as well as the
other panelists, made it clear that in calls to de-escalate and demilitarize our own police force, we
are making similar demands on the international system, as systems of militarized oppression are
now intertwined. So when I demand in this thesis for a demilitarization of the Israeli-Palestine
conflict, that demand is also intertwined with the demilitarization of police here in the US and
beyond.

Nonviolent but not Peaceful? Who and What Justifies Violence from Police at a Protest?
Naber is not the only author to point out the similarities between US and Israeli
militarized reaction to protest. Ronit Lentin provides an interesting analysis of Israel’s
annexation of Palestinian territory and response to Palestinian resistance. Lentin claims that
Israel has reproduced much of the racist logic that at one point forced many Jewish people to
settle in Israel in the first place. Using race, otherness, and settler logic, Israel is able to justify its
violence against Palestinians as well as its claims to their land. Ronit claims that Israel justifies
the militarized response to Palestine through several objectives: exempting Palestine from
statehood, exempting Palestinians from personhood and ,finally, making settler-colonial claims
to the land89. Through this lens, any violent response to Palestinian protest is justified. Lentin
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connects these justifications to the Black Lives Matter Protests, where, as Naber claimed,
protesters face similar types and uses of force.

The Future of Nonviolence in Palestine: De-escalation and Community Support
So far, I have talked about Israeli response to Palestinian protests and resistance in rather
monolithic ways. I hope to address that with this article by Polly Pallister-Wilkins titled,
“Radical Ground: Israeli and Palestinian Activists and Joint Protest Against the Wall.” In it,
Pallister recounts the joint efforts of Palestinians and Israelis in confronting the militarization
and establishment of a border wall. Those protesting the wall took a number of actions; blocking
bulldozers, dismantling the barrier, and confronting the highly armed Israeli were some of the
tactics used by both Palestinians and Israelis who found the border wall to be destructive, cruel,
and in its own way, an act of violence90. It is the cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian
activists that I would like to highlight. When Palestinian people demand representation,
distribution of material wealth, or even liberation, these demands can extend to their Israeli
peers. Similarly, activists within Israel may find allies in Palestinian activist organizations that
seek similar goals of demilitarizing society and confronting a security state that flaunts human
rights91. By establishing community and connection between Israeli and Palestinian activist
organizations, these groups can confront projects like the Wall that threaten their humanity and
their shared identity92. I argue that building these international activist networks is perhaps one
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of the greatest tools we can add in combating militarized police forces. From the examples I’ve
given so far, it seems that activist groups naturally seek similar projects, even when their borders
are separated by thousands of miles. Supporting international treaties on police use of force is
easy to say but nearly impossible to enforce on an international level. However, creating an
international community of activists that seek justice and understanding across borders and
across identities is powerful and has liberatory potential. Atalia Omer’s Days of Awe:
Reimagining Jewishness in Solidarity with Palestinians explores the tensions between American
Jews and Israel. Omer explains that for many American Jews, there is a growing connection not
with Israel, but Palestinians, and an understanding that the current Israeli state often uses force to
deny Palestinians their human rights93.
Building on the growing solidarity Israelis and Palestinian activists for social justice,
activist networks may be able to break through previously resistant communities and build
connections that not only make the activist networks stronger but disrupt harmful norms that
dictate who gets punished for protesting, and who does the punishing.
Finally, I want to point out that these activist networks don’t always have to be founded
around Palestine and Israel. Referring back to the example of the Ferguson protests, activists in
other regions of the world are finding a common cause in addressing the militarization of their
own local police responses to non-violent protests. Militarization, domination, and control are
powerful in their ability to suppress - they are also powerful forces for mobilizing solidarity,
where activists in, say, Brazil, can understand intimately what it feels like to be violently
suppressed - and thus what it feels like be Palestinian94.
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An important distinction to make in the support of these international activist networks is
their approach and theorizing related to their work. These activist groups are connecting the dots
between racism and imperialism and are thus founded not on identity politics but anti-imperialist
projects95. This distinction is an important one. Activist networks have more in common with the
anti-imperialist movements of the 1960s than they do with the neo-liberal identity politics of the
Obama era. A group protesting in Ferguson or a group protesting in Gaza are demanding
structural and systematic change, not just representative or reformative change.
If the UN seeks to create a platform for the participation of activist networks in global
policy-making, it will need to demonstrate that it is listening to all of the activists' demands.
However, I believe the international community can do even more than recognition; after
becoming the International Criminal Court’s 123rd member state, Palestine requested an
investigation into the human rights abuses suffered on its territory96. Only recently has that
investigation officially started, with the ICC making its official statement in March of 202197.
The ICC is investigating the Israel-Gaza war of 2014, Israel’s violent reaction to Palestinian
protests in 2018, and the Israeli construction of settlements on contested land. Despite Israel’s
lack of cooperation, the investigation will continue98.

95

Eichler, Maya. "Militarized Masculinities in International Relations." The Brown Journal of World Affairs 21, no.
1 (2014): 81-93.
96
Bosco, David. "Palestine in The Hague: Justice, Geopolitics, and the International Criminal Court." Global
Governance 22, no. 1 (2016):155-71.http://www.jstor.org/stable/44861186.
97
Office of the Prosecutor. “Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, respecting an investigation of the
Situation in Palestine.” March 3, 2021. https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=210303-prosecutorstatement-investigation-palestine
98
BBC News. “Israel 'Will Not Co-Operate' with ICC War Crimes Investigation.” BBC News. BBC, April 9, 2021.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-56687437.

37

Chapter VI - Military, Technology, Industry, and the Border
Thus far, this review study has investigated the connections between the military
industrial complex, cyber security, and the militarization of policing in Israel and the US
specifically in relation to controlling peaceful protests. As mentioned, these connections are
documented historically and through current industrial and security processes. I want to draw on
one final connection between the US military industrial complex and Israel - the connection
between the US Southern border with Mexico and the Israel-Palestine border. In this chapter I
will argue that the US and Israel share a militarization of their borders, especially in the
technologies they use to monitor and control border crossings, and that the US and Israel share a
discursive border, one that demarcates race and belonging and establishes control of movement.
These connections between the US and Israel’s border policies are primarily made by technology
researchers and immigration and abolition activists, though much less is said about these
connections in international relations academia. In making the connection between US and
Israel’s border policy, I hope to expand our current understanding of border policy and even
point towards new ways of understanding borders that are rarely spoken about in international
relations. This chapter will first draw connections between US and Israel border technologies
such as border wall construction and facial recognition, then between US and Israel border
norms.

Border and Checkpoint Technologies
Since the 1990s, the US border policy and strategy of enforcement along the US Mexico
border has resulted in the deaths of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers mostly from
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Central America,99 with over 2000 migrants unaccounted for from 2015-2019.100 Since 9/11 the
militarization of the border has intensified. Military, security, and police forces have tested and
used military-style surveillance technology on American citizens101. Military-style security
technology is first used on the vulnerable and marginalized, such as migrants and asylum-seekers
at border crossings, and then used on average citizens. Though, as with the example of police
militarization in response to protest, it is commonly poor and people of color in urban centers
who face the brunt of this militarized force once testing on the border is complete102. Palestine
faces a similarly militarized border with Israel, one that has also resulted in the deaths of
Palestinians103. However, this similarity is not where the connection stops; in fact, the very
technologies and methods used on the Israel-Palestine border are being shipped to the US,
deployed on our border, and then eventually, to our streets104.
The border between Israel and Palestine has shifted greatly since Israel was established in
1948. Figure 3 provides a map of the current and historical borders of Israel and Palestine. In an
interview with Brittany Dawson, Gabriel Schivone, a Visiting Scholar in the Agnese Nelms
Haury Program at the University of Arizona, claimed that various border technologies are
developed in Israel and then sold to military, security, and police forces worldwide105.
Technologies from drones to border towers to motion sensors are being developed in Israel’s
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“start-up nation,” where many of the start-ups are focused on military technologies, attributed to
Israel’s universal military service106. Schivone learned from Israeli officials that both the US and
Israel are heavily invested in the development and deployment of military-style security
technologies that often impact marginalized and vulnerable people first, namely Palestinians and
migrants107. According to Schivone, this escalation of US and Israeli border militarization has a
long history, though it is Israel’s technology that has greatly enabled the continued militarization
of both states’ border policy. Schivone says,
Beginning with Carter, the entire concept of the militarization of the U.S. border was
based on this model of integrating the military and police forces. That idea wasn’t new in
and of itself, but you still had these fundamental flaws, which the Israeli strategist was
saying they don’t have there. The Israelis introduced a new intelligence and security
apparatus equipped with extra monitors, a control-room model they’re now selling
worldwide, all of which are very efficient, to connect the disparate private-security,
military, and police elements. So as far as the military-security model that the Israelis are
selling worldwide, it’s not just technology, it’s also this integrated model that combines
walls with high-tech infrastructure and intelligence with military security forces.108
It is important to point out that these military-style security technologies are not cheap and have
earned Israeli companies millions of dollars over the last two decades109. Despite the spending
and despite the militarization, US borders frequently surge in the number of migrants it
receives110. Similarly, Israel’s militarization of the Israel-Palestine border has not ended security
threats111 and only resulted in greater intensity of Palestinian resistance112. It is clear that
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militarization of border control does not have the intended outcomes of greater security. Irus
Braverman, a legal scholar and professor at SUNY Buffalo, investigated Israeli border
technologies. Palestinians in Gaza felt safer using biometric scanners, such as facial recognition
technology, as they had more interaction with security technology rather than security
personnel113. Despite this, these border technologies often had similar outcomes for Palestinians,
resulting in extensive searches, wrongful arrests, and invasion of privacy114.
Dr. Ariel Handel, a researcher on Israel-Palestine, colonization, and political geography
writes that we should make a distinction between border and checkpoints that regulate
movement, and those that minimize movement115. Handel claims that these layers of security
within Gaza are randomly placed, cumbersome to traverse, and unpredictable in outcome,
making travel within Gaza for Palestinians, if not impossible and dangerous, extremely
unpleasant and dehumanizing116. Israeli border militarization has invaded the lives of
Palestinians, claiming a state of exemption due to threats of terror117. Israel’s security and
militarization of civilian life can be linked to the United States’ post 9/11 security state, in which
civilians become targets of the state security apparatus in the name of security118. Despite the
claimed reasoning behind these breaches in privacy and civilian life, the result is a militarized
response to everyday movement, class, and race119 Research demonstrates once more that the
technologies of border militarization may appear to be advancements in maintaining security,
however this approach to border security may be harmful to communities on both sides of the
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border. The development and deployment of military-style technology and militarized policing
happen in a social and political context. There are social and political norms that have motivated
and guided the development of these technologies and related policies. The norms and
standards for safe and protective policing need to be examined.

Who Draws the Line? Race, Gender, and Violence in Gaza and on the Border
I finally want to touch on the discursive role the militarization of the border plays. A
number of the researchers I have cited thus far have touched on this, with Ariel Handel and
Gabriel Schivone most notably. Border policy of the United States and Israel have resulted in a
racialization and marginalization of particular groups. Both borders have consistently drawn
criticism from human rights groups120. Both borders have a history of violence, primarily on the
part of state actors121. Who is most likely to be a victim of the border militaries is also consistent,
with women and Black or Arab people facing the highest levels of violence, especially those of
lower socio-economic status122;123.
Palestinian women face sexual harassment and other forms of gendered violence at
higher rates during border stops in Gaza124. For Palestinian women, these border checks have
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become sites of violence where their bodily autonomy is violated and their lives disrupted to the
point where movement within Gaza becomes dangerous and dehumanizing125.

The Future of the Borderlands
Activist coalitions have also pointed out the convergence of industry, military, and border
security126. In particular, the Boycott, Divest, and Sanction movement is highly critical of the
violence faced at the borders in Gaza127. Youth movements within the US have also pointed out
the similarities between the US - Mexico border and the Israel-Palestine border, with activists
educating their communities to change how these borders are maintained and understood128.
These activist groups do not make concrete policy suggestions in direct relation to borders; BDS
is structured around clear policy objectives (it is in their name), but their suggestions are less
targeted and aimed at Israel’s militarism and treatment of Palestinians more broadly. Youth
groups like the Palestinian Youth Movement and Colectivo Zapatista are formed around the
critique of the US and Israel-Palestine borders but have less to say about potential solutions129.
Despite these groups lacking a clear policy direction, I appreciate what they have to say about
borders, especially heavily militarized ones. These activist networks demand we question who
and what borders serve130.
While a comprehensive examination of the impact of border security is beyond the scope
of this study, there is sufficient evidence and commentary to suggest that the US immediately
125

Natanel, Katherine. 2016. “Border Collapse and Boundary Maintenance: Militarisation and the MicroGeographies of Violence in Israel–Palestine.” Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography 23 (6):
897–911. doi:10.1080/0966369X.2015.1136807.
126
Morrison, Suzanne. 2020. “Border-Crossing Repertoires of Contention: Palestine Activism in a Global Justice
Context.” Globalizations, November, 15.
127
Morrison, Suzanne. 2020. 13.
128
Quintanilla, Leslie, and Jennifer Mogannam. 2015. 1041.
129
Quintanilla, Leslie, and Jennifer Mogannam. 2015. 1042.
130
Quintanilla, Leslie, and Jennifer Mogannam. 2015. 1042.

43

halt any investment or purchasing from Israeli border and security technologies like those
described by Schivone. Like the BDS movement, I believe that cutting off funding from these
companies can directly impact their ability to continue producing harmful military technologies
for border control purposes. In addition, by ceasing these contracts, the US can also reflect on the
powerful surveillance tools it currently has at its own disposal - and maybe divest from those as
well.
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Chapter VII. Military, Society, and Class: How Average Citizens are Impacted by
Increased Militarization in Israel

Thus far I have primarily focused on the militarization of Israeli policing in Palestine, the
human rights abuses that it produces, and the negative impacts Palestinians suffer as a result. In
this last chapter before the conclusion, I want to briefly touch upon how militarization has
impacted Israeli citizens. As mentioned in Chapter V, “Disparity of Power, Disparity of
Consequence: The Use of Violence to Control Protest,” citizens of the United States also
encounter militarized police forces that are deployed to protect peaceful protests. In addition,
much has been written regarding the American experience and life in a society that is military
focused in both its culture and funding priorities. I hope to add to this conversation by
highlighting the negative impacts a militarized society can have on the Israeli people. By
expanding on this topic, I hope to show that calls for demilitarization of the Israel-Palestine
conflict do not benefit only one group of people, that settler-colonialism and militarism are
destructive systems . While disenfranchised segments of the population and minority
communities may experience a higher incidence of violence, abuse and disrespect at the hands of
the police and security services, the entire society is harmed by the increasing militarization of
law enforcement . We all have something to gain out of redirecting expenditures on the
militarization of the police into social justice programs that focus on conflict resolution,
psychosocial and other for the most vulnerable, international justice organizations, and local
community projects.
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Life Under Pressure: The Militarized Civilian
Ronald R. Krebs at The Council on Foreign Relations has identified a number of factors
that currently damage Israeli life and democracy; top among them, the prioritization of a “bunker
mentality,” in which Palestinians and the Arab world more generally are understood as a threat.
This perception gives far-right movements within the Israeli government power to control and
divert funding away from civilian programs, break down potential regional partnerships, and fuel
nationalist chauvinism131. Krebs also claims a more open border system would not only improve
regional relationships but provide a greater freedom of movement for Israeli citizens that is
currently not allowed; however, Arab citizens of Israel, that make approximately 20 percent of
the population, face the greatest limitations. In fact, Krebs claims that Arab Israelis have the
most to lose from the militarization of Israel, especially due to the funding required for the Israeli
military. As a result of that funding, other programs must be cut. Krebs, “Arab municipalities
have always received less funding and support than their Jewish counterparts, and Arab citizens
lag far behind in life expectancy, educational achievement, and employment opportunities—a
gap that has only grown in recent years.” Even worse, Krebs reports that Israeli citizens have
grown suspicious of Arab Israelis, with polling showing high levels of distrust132. Krebs claims
that these trends in marginalization of Arab Israelis and far-right extremism among Israeli
Nationalists and others is the result of Israeli foreign policy, especially its highly militarized
control of Palestine. Krebs presents a strong foundational analysis of the problems that
militarization has created for the citizens of Israel.
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Security has become a prime factor of Israel’s domestic and foreign policy133. The result
is an Israeli people whose lives have become dominated by the military; universal conscription,
lack of social program funding, and the othering of Arabs in Israel are all a result of Israel’s
singular focus on securitization and militarization134. Women in Israel and in the Israeli diaspora
feel this militarization acutely, where issues of gender and sexuality are policed by community
members, far-right extremists, and security forces135. The BDS movement again takes a center
stage in Feminist activism around the Israel military136. Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), an activist
group, uses BDS to target corporations like Caterpillar, Motorola, and Veolia that provide
equipment for the Israeli military137. The JVP takes a feminist approach to its work, highlighting
the violence that Israeli and Palestinian women face at the hands of Israeli security and military
forces138. Militarism in Israel has also produced a culture of domestic violence that pervades
military and civilian life139. Domestic violence in Israel is attributed to PTSD from military
service, military class structure, and the status of women within the Israeli military140.
Class within Israel is also largely impacted by Israel’s militarization. As mentioned,
Israel has a universal conscription for citizens. However, there are a number of exemptions that
allow someone to avoid serving in the IDF. Those who use these exemptions have experienced
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stigma and ostracization141. This stigma creates a class of citizens that are less likely to achieve
higher education and better employment as a result. Similarly, Israel’s conscription practices
reproduce class differences. An individual’s placement within the military is informed by their
familial wealth and social network. Those who enter higher level military positions are more
likely to have access to higher paying careers afterwards, while combat soldiers, who are heavily
recruited from low-income families, are less likely to experience the same benefits of social
mobility142.
With the two examples of gender and class, I have reviewed the negative impacts Israel’s
militarism - both in its culture and in its economy - have negatively affected the lives of Israeli
citizens. Critiques of Israel’s investment in security and the militarization of security services
normally focus on the impact of those policies on the Palestinians. However, it is important to
note that these policies have a harmful impact on Israeli citizens as well. Militarization impacts
everyone.
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VIII. Conclusion
The Israel-Palestine conflict is ever shifting and writing about it means constantly
updating one's sources to reflect those shifts. The election of President Joseph Biden may mean
some changes in US and Israel relations, especially with regard to the transfer of the US embassy
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem under the Trump administration.
As of this writing, Israel is in the process of forming a new government; there may be
opportunities for dialogue about the issues discussed in this review study.
The Arab region as a whole has been marred by instability in the post-9/11 era, and
anyone who writes about this region will know that their research could quickly become
outdated. As I completed the writing process, researchers at Human Rights Watch, an advocacy
and human rights policy NGO, published an extensive report on Israel and Palestine143. The
report outlined, among many things, the harm Israel’s military and security network has had on
the Palestinian people, especially those in occupied Gaza. The report was met with similar
backlash as faced by proponents of the BDS movement, with accusations of anti-Semitism a key
focus of the critiques. In an interview with reporter Owen Jones, Hanan Ashrawi, a Palestinian
diplomat asked this in reaction to the report and the human rights abuses it outlined,
“So now what does the world want to do? Will they continue granting Israel the cover...to
continue with these policies that are essentially inherently racist, exclusivist, and exclusionary, or
are they going to take action...to put an end to such behavior? Take your responsibility
seriously.”144
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Despite the backlash, the Human Rights Watch report has reignited conversation around
this topic. As mentioned, this conversation comes at a crucial time with both the US and Israel
navigating new political ground. Reports like this are exactly the kind of action I was suggesting
while writing this thesis and I maintain that position now. Large international organizations like
Human Rights Watch have a responsibility to the people of Israel and Palestine to monitor the
ongoing militarism in the country. Nonprofits like Human Rights Watch and the American
Friends Service Committee have used their resources to write and publish reports on Israel’s
human right abuses and the role of the military industry. However, without government policy
and international pressure, these NGOs and activist networks are not enough to halt the ongoing
violence and abuse being committed by Israel against the Palestinians. Nor can they adequately
protect the Palestinian people, especially those in Gaza. Human Rights Watch outlines how
countries in Europe, the Middle East, and North America can change their international policies
to address this issue. I will suggest some policies the United States could adopt to help combat
militarization of the police forces and the growth in military expenditure.

De-escalation and the Future of Israel-Palestine
I have been careful not to make any recommendation in favor of a one state, two state, or
other alternative solution through this paper. That is because, as Hanan Ashrawi says, no matter
what the solution is, unless we address Israel’s military relationship with Palestine, the
Palestinian people will not benefit either way. Similarly, I have not called for the US to cease its
relationship with Israel nor its aid, which is already approved in the most recent budget for year
2021145. However, I have several policy suggestions for the Biden administration and congress to
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consider in the future: first, I hope to see the Democratic party remove its current language about
the BDS movement in future party platforms. As the Human Rights Watch report outlines,
framing any and all criticism of Israel as a state as anti-Semitic prevents coherent dialogue and
change.
Similarly, I want the US policy going forward to divest its current military and security
contracts with Israel. This targeted divestment, not a boycott or sanction, will impact the military
industries the most while maintaining open lines of communication and trade with Israel.
Finally, this divestment would greatly impact Israel’s private military corporations from
testing and developing the digital security network already being used to spy on Palestinian
civilians. The use of digital technologies by the military to spy on private citizens is concerning
for many in the fields of digital privacy and data protection.
The relationship between Israel and the United States is complicated by their history with
the Middle East - Israel's reaction to the 1948-49 war has led it down a road of militarism. The
United States has used its relationship with Israel to dominate the Middle East region first in the
Cold War period and now more recently in the post-9/11 War on Terror. The relationship
between Israel and Palestine has become increasingly military-focused with billions spent on
funding military and security equipment, forces, and operations. I maintain that the US could
find more effective ways of spending its citizen’s tax dollars than on new tools of war for Israel’s
military and police force. President Eisenhower’s words on the military-industrial complex
sound like a warning to us now.
Finally, international courts like the ICC have proven to have an interest in pursuing
justice. The ICC is investigating possible crimes by Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank,
Gaza, and East Jerusalem since 2014. However, the Biden administration and Secretary of State
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Antony Blinken in particular oppose these proceedings146. As previously stated, Israel also
opposes the ICC investigation, claiming Palestine is not a state and does not have the right to
join the ICC.
Despite this tension, the US has seen an increase criticism towards the kinds of funding
the US sends to Israel147. I am hopeful the Biden administration will reverse some of the Trump
policies in the region, especially the recognition of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital. These policy
actions only prevent peaceful dialogue between the two states from occurring. I hope future
researchers and policy makers can continue to investigate the relationship between the military
industrial complex Israel, and Palestine as myself and organizations like Human Rights Watch
have done.
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Figure 1. U.S. Arms Sale Notifications to Israel, 2015 - 2020148
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Figure 2. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Israel149
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Figure 3. Israel-Palestine Border Evolution150
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